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Abstract 
This master thesis concerns the influence civil society organizations (CSOs) on 
the rule of law in CEE EU member states. Democracy promotion theory 
proposes that strong CSOs safeguard the rule of law. The empirical analysis 
(regression and fs QCA) finds a strong negative correlation between weak CSOs 
and a fragile rule of law. However, the theory cannot be fully confirmed. The 
findings also show that additional factors, external actor involvement and 
national governments, may positively as well as negatively influence the rule 
of law. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Sliding backwards  
 
In March 2017, a bill proposed by the governing party Fidesz, targeted universities with a foreign 
accreditation, specifically the Central European University (CEU) funded by George Soros’ Open Society 
Foundation. Soros has long been a thorn in Orban’s flesh who, ironically is one of the CEU’s most 
prominent graduates. The bill which was discussed and ratified by the Hungarian parliament in highest 
pace, requires universities with foreign accreditation to maintain a campus in its country of 
accreditation or otherwise a state treaty between Hungary and the university’s country of 
accreditation must be established. The latter requirement is in many cases impossible to fulfill as it 
entails a legal construct that is nonexistent in, for instance, the United States which is the CEU’s country 
of accreditation. In addition to this first bill, a leak inside the Orban administration revealed plans to 
curtail freedoms of NGOs operating in Hungary. The proposal encompasses measures to require NGOs 
to publish the sources of their funding and register as a foreign funded NGO if more than 27 000 Euros 
of its budget comes from foreign sources. Moreover, also funding from EU institutions that is not 
channeled and redirected through some level of the Hungarian government, will be labeled as foreign 
funding. Yet, the NGO bill masks itself as a bill of counter-terrorism and internal security measures 
which in light of contemporary events generally receives public support. These recent developments 
demonstrate the increasingly difficult circumstances for civil society in Hungary.  
 
The CEU, as a representative of academia as well as NGOs active in Hungary, are actors which partly 
constitute civil society, specifically civil society that is organized and does not merely refer to loose 
groups of citizens protesting in the streets. In addition, successful demonstrations however, can also 
be the outcome of successful civil society mobilization. Civil society organizations are often viewed as 
an important weight to counter the power of the state as it provides a soft checks and balances.  
 
Extensive research on the so called active leverage, largely referring to the accession conditionality, 
demonstrated that the EU’s role did provide significant incentives to accession candidates to reform 
their political systems (Vachudova 2005). In contrast to other post-communist states that were not 
part of the accession procedures, candidate countries progressed towards the level of established EU 
members in fields of, inter alia, civil and political rights and democratic governance. The EU’s active 
leverage created a competitive political space by working through society to change the institutional 
and information environment. CSOs are an essential feature to such endeavors as they have the 
capacities to collect, evaluate and relay crucial information to the public. Three aspects of active EU 
leverage can be distinguished: (1) the political Copenhagen criteria which most importantly feature 
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the rule of law and human rights and safeguards for democracy, (2) the economic Copenhagen criteria 
which comprise the notion of a free and competitive market economy and lastly (3) the acquis 
communautaire. The acquis consists of nearly 100 000 pages of legislation and regulations, adopted 
by EU member states which candidates need to include into national legislation to qualify for 
membership.  
 
This thesis aims to identify the role civil society organizations play in respect of the rule of law in the 
new Eastern and Central European member states of the EU. In the absence of active leverage, how 
can compliance with the acquis and therefore the rule of law be maintained? The theoretical literature 
which will be discussed in the second chapter grants a pivotal role to CSOs in the context of democratic 
consolidation and rule of law protection. To determine this role, the empirical analysis and discussion 
of this thesis will allow me to find an answer to my research question: 
 
What impact do civil society organizations have on democratic backsliding, specifically executive 
aggrandizement, in Central and Eastern European EU member states? 
 
 
1.2. Case selection 
 
The European Union’s most recent three waves of enlargements in 2004 and 2007 and 2013 
incorporated states that were part of the Soviet Union and/or underwent regime change in the time 
after the fall of the iron curtain. Newly acceded member states are largely Central and Eastern 
European (CEE). Two new member states, specifically Malta and Cyprus, will not be part of further 
analysis, as they are geographically and historically distinct from the remaining eleven countries: Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (all 2004), Romania and 
Bulgaria (both 2007) and lastly Croatia (2013). 
 
The EU may offer, under Article 49 TEU, a general membership perspective to any European state that 
adheres to fundamental political principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law norms (Art. 6 TEU). Much research demonstrated that only 
a credible accession promise will commit political elites to comply with EU requirements (e.g. see 
Vachudova, 2005). Only once those requirements (Copenhagen Criteria) are fully met and the 
candidate country can be considered a liberal democracy, EU membership will be offered. However, 
recent developments in, inter alia, Romania and Hungary raised concerns about a backsliding of the 
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rule of law, that in the absence of the accession conditionality, the EU would lose its leverage vis-à-vis 
these countries (Iusmen, 2015).  
 
Unfortunately accession conditionality, the EU’s most powerful bargaining chip in negotiations with 
candidate countries, cannot be used as leverage in contemporary cases of democratic backsliding in 
CEE EU member states. Since 1998, the EU has a new sanctioning instrument, Article 7 TEU, to respond 
to systemic threats to the rule of law in member states. A qualified majority is needed to trigger Article 
7; however, the decision must be based on a prior assessment of the systemic threat that the EU is 
responding too. The very establishment of a breach is profoundly difficult, as it requires a two-third 
majority in the European Parliament and unanimity minus one in the Council (Sedelmeier, 2017, 339). 
Thus, new and effective strategies are needed. As the experience with softer mechanisms, such as the 
new rule of law framework of the European Commission or the Rule of law dialogue initiated by the 
European Council have shown, such instruments are often well intended while not changing much 
domestically (Kochenov & Pech, 2015). Therefore, the EU needs to find multiple approaches to first 
directly respond to rule of law breaches and second support the consolidation process of democracies 
that are at stake.  
 
 
1.3. Relevance of research: what does it all matter? 
 
Two distinct trends feature the democracies of various European Union member states in the last two 
decades. Firstly, the hollowing of democracies which refers to decreasing citizen participation in 
democratic processes, e.g. elections and the general weakening of civil society (Greskovits, 2015). 
Secondly, democratic backsliding comprises the notion of more profound attacks on the democratic 
system. Democratic backsliding may occur in three different forms: promissory coups, executive 
aggrandizement and blatant election day vote fraud (Bermeo, 2016). Drawing from recent 
developments in Poland, Hungary as well as Turkey (even though situated outside of the EU), executive 
aggrandizement enjoys the biggest popularity by democracies’ adversaries. Broadly speaking however, 
the term democratic backsliding is often used synonymously with the general weakening of democratic 
systems (Bermeo, 2016).  
 
On the one side, democratic backsliding is mostly initiated by ruling elites, on the other hollowing of 
democracies is a development within the non-state level of society, organizations and individuals as 
such (Mair, 2006). The role of civil society in the context of democratic consolidation is often viewed 
as a soft checks and balances on institutions, elites and governments. Civil society limits the power of 
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ruling elites as they provide continuous monitoring and evaluation of a government’s undertakings 
(Diamond, 1994). Moreover, they provide access to this information to citizens and ensure that abuses 
of power and breaches of the law are subject to public scrutiny. Civil society comprises a multitude of 
non-state actors, from the global economic elite meeting in Davos under the umbrella of the World 
Economic Forum, to democracy watchdogs like Freedom House or Transparency International, to 
name but the most internationally active ones.  
 
For some time now, democracy promotion literature has emphasized the importance of civil society 
for democratic consolidation as it can constitute an important counter weight to the government 
(Scholte, 2002). However, until now there is relatively little evidence to support this claim. Thus, it is 
key to assess the potential impact civil society organizations can have in young democracies and 
whether they play a significant role for the prevention of democratic backsliding.  
 
 
1.4. Research Design 
 
At the center of my methodological framework is a method that is rather new to the social sciences, 
yet has been proven useful when aiming to identify complex causal patterns, Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). QCA is particularly valuable to determine what necessary and 
sufficient conditions are connected to the outcome of interest. The initial version of QCA developed 
by Ragin in 1987 was based on the dichotomization of variables and their further computed evaluation 
by Boolean algebra. These values were called crisp values. However, QCA has evolved into an ever 
more sophisticated method by moving from the mere dichotomization of variables to varying degrees 
of membership to respective variables, called fuzzy values. Fuzzy values are values between 0 (no 
membership) and 1 (full membership).   
 
Political sciences research often resorts to statistical methods to arrive at causal accounts of societal 
phenomena (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, 752). The subfield of democratic consolidation studies is 
one of the political sciences issues that could potentially suffer from methodological approaches 
involving large-N designs as causal complexity, which is commonly understood as multiple conjunctural 
causation, is at its heart (Ragin, 1987). “Causal complexity is the exact opposite of the assumptions of 
linear and additive regression analysis not to mention the unifinal character of regression” (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2006, 254). There are different paths to democratic consolidation. Fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fs QCA) enables researchers to identify these paths while simultaneously finding 
causal patterns across cases. Even though the rule of law and democratic consolidation are two 
  
7 
separate concepts, the former is indeed a necessary condition for the latter. Social scientists have long 
struggled to identify the different pathways to the consolidation of the rule of law. QCA could provide 
a method useful to moving closer to finding answers to what makes the rule of law stronger.    
 
Fs QCA embodies a sound methodological approach for the goal of my research, learning about the 
role of CSOs in combination with other potential causal conditions for the rule of law. In Chapter 3 I 
am going to discuss my research design and operationalization of variables and indicators in more 
detail.  
 
 
1.5. Roadmap  
 
To answer my research question, I will begin with an exploration of the relevant literature on civil 
society, democratic backsliding and the rule of law in the European Union. I will highlight the theoretic 
notions which will be of use for my thesis and that contribute to my theoretical framework. 
Subsequently, I will present my expectations and formulate hypotheses Furthermore, I will discuss my 
methodology, variables, their operationalization as well as indicators and form of measurement. 
Following will be a critical analysis of my results, their implications for my research question and lastly 
some potential directions for future research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Civil society as an actor on its own 
 
For a coherent and useful operationalization of civil society organizations (CSOs), it is imperative to be 
precise about the conceptual attributes given to CSOs in the research of this thesis. Most concepts of 
civil society differ much in scope and perspectives, yet all remain rather fuzzy in their definitional 
approaches (Edwards & Foley, 1996, 39). One of the crucial theoretical considerations to be made 
when studying CSOs and democratization is the proximity of political actors to CSOs. Thus, one of the 
important questions we need to ask is, under what circumstances civil society should rather be 
characterized as political society? For instance, Robert Putnam’s study on civil society in Italy 
emphasized the strength of civil society organizations in Italy’s northern region Emilia Romagna, while 
the region’s sport clubs, cooperatives and cultural organizations were largely facilitated by two 
competing parties, the Christians and the Communists (1993). Moreover, there is not one single theory 
dominating civil society research but rather many competing approaches (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 
2012, 15). Yet, this is not necessarily a weakness of civil society research but also a strength as it allows 
researchers to focus on a specific function civil society takes. Before alluding relevant functions, I will 
distinguish two essentially different conceptual islands of civil society. 
 
Aristotle first evoked the notion of the societas civilis as groups of citizens that collectively govern their 
own community (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2012, 37). However, only during the Enlightenment did the 
interdependence of society and state, find a wider response and support. As feudal and absolutist 
forms of governance were replaced with more democratic or republican structures, society distinct 
from the elites played an increasingly important role (Powell, 2010, 354). Moreover, with the French 
Revolution, the right to freely associate became recognized and spread together with other civil and 
political rights across Europe. In particular, German philosopher Hegel is considered to be one of the 
key theorists for civil society (Powell, 354). His ideas are fundamental because he clearly distinguished 
civil society from the state, yet he still emphasized its pivotal role within the political sphere. On the 
one hand, civil society is conceptualized as a sphere in between citizens and the state. Thus, civil society 
is a space of interaction (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2012, 16). On the other hand, civil society can be 
viewed as an actor on its own (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 16). The latter corresponds to a functional 
view of civil society and is often employed in studies that aim to identify specific contributions of civil 
society to democratization (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 17).  
 
This actor-centered understanding of civil society can be differentiated further. The republican 
perspective, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, places civil society complementary to the state. 
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According to this view, civil society fulfills educational and socialization functions. It is imperative to 
recognize the implications of those functions for the understanding of democracy within the 
republican paradigm of civil society. Thus, democracy is understood as an inclusive and cooperative 
design of governance that closely intertwines citizens and governing elites (Alexander, 1998, 3). 
Furthermore, following this line of reasoning civil society educates for democracy by facilitating the 
societal and individual internalization of democratic norms and values (Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech, 2012, 
19). Thus, civil society may also recruit, train and supply prospective political officials. It not only 
pursues such educational functions, but also creates social capital by facilitating the development of a 
pluralistic society on the long run and mediating between political and civil spheres in the short run.  
 
The term civil society corresponds to some degree to the public or the people. Mass publics are often 
manipulated and misused by demagogues in attempts to gain power (Diamond, 1999, 220). To avoid 
a potential negative impact of the mass publics on the consolidation process of democracies, they need 
to be organized and socialized to have firm, shared principles. While the third wave of democratization 
created young democracies with free and competitive elections, it did not fully establish rule of law 
based states. Hence, for governments to further reform and ultimately institutionalize democratic 
norms, mass publics are needed to generate political pressure (Diamond, 220). Furthermore, scholars 
of democratization make a distinction between civic community and civil society (Putnam, 1995). Civic 
community is what embodies and nurtures civic culture in that it embodies values of inclusiveness, 
responsiveness, cooperation and reciprocity. Even though civic community and civil society are not 
synonymous concepts, the latter is essential for the former.  
 
In contrast to the republican paradigm of civil society, the liberal perspective places civil society as a 
counterpart to the state. Consequently, civil society is meant to monitor and constrain state power 
and thus function as an informal checks and balances on governments. Additionally, they are 
advocates for civil and political rights and aim to defend these if needed. The most crucial long-term 
and indirect objective is the provision of information on the governing regime to citizens. Through the 
evaluation and communication of information to citizens, civil society acts as a watchdog and provides 
necessary means to mobilize the public to exert pressure on the state and its administrations, for 
instance, by demonstrating. Hence, the liberal perspective proposes an antagonistic and therefore 
tense relationship of civil society and state, a relationship that is characterized by the continuous 
struggle involving the people and the governing elites. Thus, social movements are not only fueled by 
information supplied from civil societies but often also civil society organizations provide the 
organizational frameworks needed to collectively contest government actions (Diamond, 1999, 247).  
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Despite civil society’s revival during the enlightenment, in the late 19th century and the first half of the 
20th century it only played a minor role for political and academic developments (Keane, 2010, 461). 
The rather peaceful revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary that brought their totalitarian 
governments to their knees in the late 1980s as well as the color revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine and 
Georgie in the early 2000s were vital to the renaissance of academic civil society research. These 
developments also contributed to the establishment of the civil society orthodox which describes the 
causal chain of NGOs resembling civil society which ultimately safeguard democracy (Salmenniemi, 
2008, 5).  
 
In the late 20th century, civil society was again portrayed as “non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive” 
(Keane, 2010, 461) and most importantly seen in a constant power struggle with governmental 
institutions which actions civil society seeks to monitor, evaluate and constrain. This corresponds to 
notions of civil society that were prevalent during the Enlightenment and forgotten for over a century 
and a half (Keane, 1998, 4). By now, the language of civil society and its much-emphasized importance 
have become focal point of the endeavors of the social sciences, politicians and democracy promotors 
alike. Strikingly, this particular language of civil society became synonymous with the language of 
democracy. Nowadays, many scholars and practitioners conceptualize democracy as the continuous 
struggle, distribution, monitoring and constraining of power between citizens and exercised by citizens 
(Keane, 2010, 462). Therefore, liberal civil society theorists propose civil society as the key to a stable 
democracy as powers need to be balanced and checked not only by institutions of the state but by 
non-state actors as well. However, who are these non-state actors and who can we classify as civil 
society organizations (CSOs)?  
 
2.1.1. Civil Society Organizations  
 
What distinguishes civil society from civic community is the former’s “organized social life that is open, 
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by 
a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1999, 221). Civil society lies in between the private 
sphere and the political realm. As soon as civil society organizations and movements are captured by 
the state and/or political parties, CSOs are no longer autonomous and consequently belong to the 
political realm. Even though political parties and other political actors possess similar characteristics 
as CSOs, they differ in one important dimension. For instance, in the course of the South African 
struggle against apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) was the powerful engine behind the 
large social movement against racial segregation and for democracy. Even though the ANC was 
autonomous from the state, it clearly sought to take control of it as well. Yet, CSOs do not seek to seize 
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power (democratically) as they are a counter weight to state power. CSOs comprise various types of 
organizations with different constituencies, interests and forms. They may have economic, cultural, 
educational, lobbying, developmental, civic or issue-oriented backgrounds.  
 
There are five respects in which CSOs differ from other groups in society (Diamond, 1999, 223). Firstly, 
they care about collective problems instead of private concerns and to solve those, CSOs are non-
exclusive, non-secretive and allow for free debates open and receptive to public opinion. Secondly, 
even though they do not seek to take control of the state, they relate to the state as it provides the 
framework for civil society’s policy goals, principle objectives such as accountability or justice. In other 
words, usually the state constitutes the reform target for CSOs. Thirdly, CSOs are anti-parochial and 
therefore pluralistic and diverse. Fourthly, CSOs only represent selective interests and do not claim to 
represent the whole of society. However, they differ from corporatist associations in that they are 
governed democratically and pursue democratic ends. Lastly, as already pointed out, CSOs are distinct 
from the civic community.  
 
Three core democratizing functions can be derived from these five distinctive characteristics of CSOs. 
First, they allow for various groups in society to have a voice on issues the state is concerned with. As 
civil society represents multiple and often diverging interests, CSOs also function as multi-faceted 
watchdogs vis-à-vis the state (Mercer, 2002, 8). Therefore, they can improve the quality of democracy 
by including different voices to the democratic process and by enabling different interest groups to 
form issue-bound alliances (Mercer, 8). Second, CSOs often give voice to disadvantaged and 
marginalized groups of societies. Not only can they widen, but also deepen democratic participation, 
by for instance representing interests of very remotely living communities (for instance see Clark, 
1991). Pressure coming from the hierarchical bottom of society also yields the chance to instigate 
political reforms initiated by the elites on the top (Mercer, 2002, 8). Third, CSOs constitute another 
component to the systems of checks and balances within a country’s political system. CSOs operate on 
the national as well as the regional and local level depending on their mandate. They challenge the 
autonomy of respective governments by demanding changes in procedures and policies, pressing for 
involvement in decision making processes and by developing and providing contrasting values and 
ideas (Mercer, 9).  
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2.2. Democratic backsliding in the 21st century  
   
Recently media outlets, politicians as well as parts of academia imply a threat for consolidated 
democracies by highlighting that authoritarian leaders as well as authoritarian norms are on the rise 
(for instance see Foa & Mounk, 2016). Contemporary developments in CEE EU member states, such as 
Hungary or Poland, but also outside of the EU, for instance in Turkey or even the most recent incidents 
in the United States, are usually taken as contemporary phenomena of democratic backsliding. 
Traditional forms of democratic backsliding, most commonly blatant election day vote fraud, coup 
d’états and executive coups by elected leaders decreased in frequency since the breakdown of the 
communist block 1990 (Bermeo, 2016, 6). While these are positive developments, unfortunately this 
did not result in a general decrease in democratic backsliding but rather in a diversification of its 
appearances. Broadly speaking, democratic breakdowns or the gradual, but significant weakening of 
established democratic institutions can be regarded as forms of democratic backsliding. In particular, 
the gradual weakening of democratic institutions which is a rather fluid development is as difficult to 
clearly determine as it is to combat.  
 
Three forms of democratic backsliding can be distinguished. Firstly, promissory coups occur with some 
frequency in young and flawed democracies (Bermeo, 2016, 8). They differ from traditional coups in 
that the regime-overthrowing party initially promises to restore democratic principles and governance, 
while in fact this occurs in least cases, as events in Haiti show. In some cases, elections were held some 
time after the coup, yet the competing parties were either hand-picked by the military or other forces 
in power, as in Fiji in 2001 or the party that conducted the coup in the first place won the elections 
(Bermeo, 9). Secondly, another form of democratic backsliding is the strategic manipulation of 
elections. Hence, this is a more sophisticated set of actions aimed at moving the elections in favor of 
the manipulator. Moreover, manipulation of elections takes place long before the actual elections and 
comprises activities such as amending the rules of the game, e.g. electoral procedures or restriction of 
certain demographic groups to participate in elections (Bermeo, 13). Furthermore, electoral 
manipulations may encompass the establishment of limitations of media freedoms, the harassment of 
competitors or even keeping them off the ballot. A third form of democratic backsliding that often can 
be observed jointly with election manipulation is executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 11). Prominent 
examples of executive aggrandizement are Recep Erdogan’s and his party AKP’s efforts to replace the 
existing parliamentary democracy with a presidential system, or Victor Orban’s endeavors to minimize 
the operability of NGOs in Hungary, curtail media freedoms and pack the constitutional courts with 
favorable judges. Executive aggrandizement entails the expansion of executive powers at the cost of 
the two other branches of government, the legislative and the judiciary. Hence, this usually results in 
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the weakening of legislative forums, such as the parliament and a loss of independence of the courts. 
The system of checks and balances that is pivotal for the maintenance of the rule of law and democracy 
is therefore severely hampered. First and foremost, principles of accountability are undermined. Those 
however are crucial for democratic governance and the preservation of the rule of law.  
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that executive aggrandizement constitutes an attack on the 
rule of law as it infringes on several principles, such as the separation of powers, accountability of 
government officials as well as the security of civil and political rights for citizens. In the following 
section, I am going to discuss relevant notions of the rule of law, how they relate to democracy as well 
as its role in the European Union.  
 
 
2.3. Understanding the rule of law 
  
The anecdotal founding father of the rule of law, Lon Fuller considered the rule of law from a rather 
legal-philosophical perspective (1969). His idea of the rule of law was a rather narrow 
conceptualization which he entertained by use of the fable of King Rex (Fuller, chapter 2). King Rex is 
a fantastic ruler who demonstrates “eight distinct routes to disaster” (Fuller, 39) that are, if reversely 
formulated, eight requirements laws needs to meet to be considered a successful law, leaving any 
normative judgements about the content of the law aside. Consequently, laws must be generally 
formulated and applicable, publicly accessible, non-retroactive, clearly formulated and therefore easily 
understandable, non-contradictory, ensure legal certainty thus they cannot change frequently to the 
liking of the ruler, applied consistently and lastly legal subjects need to be able to obey the law in the 
first place. Such thin definition of the rule of law also comprises the notion of legal positivism. It 
becomes evident that as the core notion distilled in these requirements is the principle of 
accountability. It should be noted that the rule of law and democracy are not necessarily congruent. 
There are countries, most prominently Singapore, that do conform with these conditions but clearly 
are not by a democratic system. Therefore, the rule of law is a necessary condition, yet not sufficient 
condition for a liberal democracy.  
 
The rule of law establishes a system under the supremacy of the law. Hence, this presupposes the 
principle that the law applies equally to every citizen who are as a result accountable to the law (United 
Nations Security Council, 2004, 4). Inherent to the rule of law is also the independence of the judiciary 
including its courts, its judges and prosecutors as well as enforcing authorities, such as national police 
(Carothers, 1998, 96). It is crucial to the maintenance of judicial independence that the judicative 
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branch remains free from influence from other branches of governments, especially the control of the 
executive. Moreover, the government needs to be embedded in a coherent and complete legal 
framework that ensures the functioning of an independent system of checks and balances tying 
governmental branches together (Carothers, 96). The rule of law is also key to upholding civil and 
political rights. By ensuring the right to a fair trial in due time, the foundations for safeguarding 
essential human rights are laid.  
 
To be sure, individual rights constitute the fundament for every democracy. “A government’s respect 
for the sovereign authority of the people and a constitution depends on its acceptance of the law” 
(Carothers, 1998, 97). In other words, the acceptance of the law as such presupposes the subordination 
of the state with all its institutions to the law and thus, for the state to be bound by the law.  Moreover, 
institutions pivotal for the functioning of a democracy, may also contribute to the compliance with the 
rule of law.  
 
Normatively speaking, the EU is founded on a tripod of the rule of law, democracy and the respect for 
fundamental rights. These principles, in addition to the notion of nondiscrimination of minorities are 
now known as the Copenhagen Criteria which need to be met to become a member of the EU 
(European Commission, 1993, 7.A.iii) The Copenhagen Criteria are the formal conditions for accession 
that candidate countries need to meet and moreover encompass (2) a functioning market economy 
and (3) the full implementation of the acquis which refers to the body of EU legislation all existing 
member states have already implemented over the course of their membership. These conditions for 
membership can moreover be found in the Treaty on the European Union, specifically Article 49 setting 
forth the formal conditions for membership and Article 6 (1) laying down the normative principles 
every member needs to adhere to.  
 
 
2.4. A Union founded on the rule of law 
 
The rule of law is one of the most frequently referred to principles of the European Union. The 
Commission, Parliament as well as various EU agencies often cite the rule of law as a pivotal pillar of 
the EU’s legal and political culture (e.g. see European Commission, 2016). It was in 1986 that the 
European Court of Justice first mentioned the rule of law as a foundational norm, laid down in the 
informal constitution of the European Communities (EC), the Treaty of Rome (1957) to which its 
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member states had to submit to1. In 1992 the Maastricht treaty was ratified with several references to 
the rule of law (European Union, 1992). Subsequently, in 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam (European 
Union: Council of the European Union, 1997; further referred to as Treaty of the European Union: TEU) 
established not only the tripod of respect for fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law (Art. 
6(1) TEU), but also created a mechanism to trigger sanctions in case of noncompliance with the 
foundational norms of the European Union (Art. 7 TEU; often cited as the nuclear option).  
 
However, there is still no consensus on the scope of the rule of law in the European Union, as it is 
neither defined in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) nor does a single member state have the rule of law (or 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit or Etat de droit) clearly spelled out, with the exception of Spain (Pech, 2010, 364). 
Despite the multitude of references to the rule of law being a foundational norm and perhaps 
especially because of the fuzzy statements about its nature, the dissensus on its meaning, scope and 
application remains. Nonetheless, the rule of law is a constitutional feature that legal systems of EU 
member states progressively share (Pech, 362).  
 
The rule of law in the EU is best understood as a meta principle on which other foundational principles 
depend on and are otherwise connected to, e.g. the protection of fundamental rights or democratic 
values. In its narrow meaning, the rule of law implies and consequently led to the implementation of 
judicial review processes in all member states. As a result, all public power must be subject to legal 
constraints that places the individual citizen at its heart whose rights are ought to be protected against 
the unlawful exercise of power. Moreover, the rule of law equips citizens with possibilities to take 
action in case of arbitrary use of power by public officials. The rule of law is therefore also an 
instrument for citizens to defend their rights when they are being infringed.  
 
When elected decision makers, for instance presidents or prime ministers, begin to accumulate more 
power than constitutionally given, the system of checks and balances is disturbed. Ideally, citizens are 
then able to fight back, by legal means, thus instrumentally using the tools provided by the rule of law 
and by means of mobilization of the public to exert pressure on decision makers coming from different 
channels. This is, in times of crisis, when CSOs take a crucial role. The graveness of the situation and 
the attack on the rule of law or democracy must be profoundly emphasized to make it a salient issue 
for the mass public to adequately respond to. Democratic backsliding in the form of executive 
aggrandizement is therefore conceptualized as a weakening of the rule of law. The prior sections 
                                                           
1 For more details on the ECHR’s ruling, consult: Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, 
paragraph 23  
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demonstrated that it is the rule of law that constraints public officials. The next section of this chapter 
will focus on how civil society can supporting the safeguarding of the rule of law.   
 
 
2.5. Connecting the dots: civil society and its role for the rule of law  
 
The role of civil society for democratization is two-fold. Firstly, mass mobilization initiated by civil 
society is necessary to initiate successful transitions. Secondly, civil society plays a pivotal role for the 
consolidation process of established democracies. 
 
Conventional wisdom in democratization research has been that transitions to democracy are usually 
the product of elite bargaining between authoritarian leaders and leaders of the democratic 
opposition (Bunce, 2003, 171). However, the post-communist experience provided evidence that 
challenged these assumptions. The most successful transitions to democracy in CEE countries, 
occurred in Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia indeed began with mass 
protests (Bunce, 2003, 172).  Hungary is an outlier here, as it was considered an example for a 
successful transition that was not initiated by mobilization of mass publics (Bunce, 172). Yet, recent 
political developments in the country also challenge its status of a successfully consolidated 
democracy. Successful transition dynamics in most new EU member states demonstrated that due to 
pressure from mobilized mass publics, opposition leaders were eager to introduce more radical 
reforms than in other post-communist states with less public pressure. This was because vast civil 
society mobilization was threatening to authoritarian leader as it provided a clear mandate to the 
opposition in breaking with the communist past (Bunce, 174). 
 
Most importantly however for this thesis is civil society’s role for the consolidation and further the 
prevention of deconsolidation of established democracies. Civil society organizations take a crucial 
role in every democratic system. Civil society encompasses organizations concerned with cultural 
activities, arts, sports, economics etc. CSOs that frequently engage with political issues, are issue driven 
and take up salient topics constitute just one aspect of a country’s civil society landscape. Often, they 
operate as interest groups, representing and channeling the concerns of their constituencies, are given 
a role in decision making processes, advise decision makers on issues of their expertise or build up 
public pressure or coalition with like-minded interest groups when needed.  
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2.6. Influencing the Rule of Law: Investigating additional causal conditions 
 
Much research on democratic consolidation has demonstrated that trust is critical to democracy 
(Mishler & Rose, 2001). Young democracies, such as the post-communist member states of the 
European Union, are especially in need of political trust to ensure the continuance of their democratic 
consolidation processes. In a democracy, trust in political institutions, such as local and national 
governments as well as the judicial system, stands in stark contrast to patronal societies which are a 
frequent feature of authoritarian regimes. Patronalism is one of the strongest legacies of the 
communist regimes under the Soviet Union (Hale, 2016, 28). In patronal societies, personal 
connections matter significantly more than formal constraints and procedures laid down by the law. 
As a consequence, usually the rule of law is not respected and nepotism is fairly common (Hale, 28). 
Corruption is another factor that undermines trust of the public in political institutions and its 
representatives. High levels of perceived corruption might also influence people’s willingness to 
engage in democratic processes, civic activities, such as protests or community engagement. When 
the public believes that corrupt politicians and bureaucrats are not equally subject to the law and 
consequently prosecuted and appropriately punished, then this can undermine citizens’ willingness to 
commit themselves to solving societal problems or actively taking a stand on an issue of their concern.  
 
Furthermore, external actor involvement can be key for influencing the rule of law generally and in 
CEE EU member states specifically. The most important external actor in these countries, also after 
accession, remains the European Union and its institutions relevant to and concerned with the 
protection of the rule of law in member states. For instance, the European Commission has 
discretionary powers to initiate infringement procedures on the basis of sufficient evidence for 
breaches of EU law by a EU member state (TFEU, Art. 258). It launched the latest infringement 
procedure against a CEE member state, in particular Hungary, on the 17th of May this year (Georgi 
Gotev, 2017). This infringement procedure concerns the treatment of refugees and migrants in 
Hungary which is regarded to breach fundamental rights every person enjoys in the EU. Thus, the 
Commission as well as less powerful institutions within the EU’s political framework, such as the 
European Parliament can exert pressure on national governments in response to legal breaches and 
other concerning developments. There are several mechanisms in place that are useful for such 
endeavors, most notably the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) concerning Bulgaria and 
Romania or the relatively new rule of law framework. The CVM was established to address 
shortcomings related to the rule of law in the two countries acceded in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania 
and gives the European Commission leverage to pressure both countries to further reform in the 
absence of the active leverage the EC had during the accession negotiations. Accession negotiations 
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with Croatia were concluded in 2011 and the country officially joined the union two years after, in 
2013. During accession negotiations, all 35 chapters of the acquis are opened and countries must 
harmonize their national legislation with EU standards in fields varying from environment, science and 
research to the judicial system, fundamental rights and the movement of goods, labor and capital. 
Countries applying for membership strongly desire to join the EU and need to comply with all bodies 
of EU law to be eligible for membership. Hence, the EU obtains profound leverage due to these 
negotiations to push candidate countries to reform, inter alia, their legal and political system. Strong 
external actor involvement in the forms discussed here, might therefore have positive effects on the 
rule of law in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.  
 
 
2.7. Hypotheses  
 
From the theoretical discussion above, I conclude two hypotheses which I aim to answer with the 
following empirical analysis. To be sure, in the following low rule of law performance is also referred 
to as rule of law breakdown. The two hypotheses and the three sub-hypotheses will aid me in 
answering my research question.  
 
H1: Weakness of civil society organizations is correlated with low levels of rule of law performance in 
CEE EU member states. 
 
H2: Weakness of civil society organizations in CEE EU member states is a necessary condition for low 
rule of law breakdown. 
 
H2.1: External actor involvement, by means of the CVM or recent accession negotiations 
mitigates the negative effects of CSO weakness on rule of law performance. 
 
H2.2: Low levels of public trust in political institutions in combination with CSO weakness are 
correlated with rule of law breakdown. 
 
H2.3: High levels of perception of widespread corruption in combination with CSO weakness 
have detrimental effects on rule of law performance.  
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3. Research Design and Operationalization 
 
My empirical analysis is divided into two sections. Firstly, I will investigate the relationship of the rule 
of law and civil society organizations at the aggregate level. This step is necessary to establish a 
correlation between the two variables of interest before proceeding with a more detailed and 
sophisticated empirical analysis. Secondly, I will critically evaluate a combination of factors that are 
conducive to a strong rule of law in conjunction with civil society organization. 
 
In both stages of my research, the unit of analysis remains the same: EU member states from Central 
and Eastern Europe which joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. However, the level of measurement 
varies. Indicators for the rule of law and for the weakness of civil society organizations are expert 
based, while indicators for additional causal conditions are composed of individual responses to survey 
or interview question from Eurobarometer. The following sections will provide more detail on the 
composition of each indicator. 
 
 
3.1. Stage 1: Pretests 
 
The first stage of my research consists of descriptive statistics. The number of cases is quite limited 
(n=11). The mere use of descriptive statistics or regression for the establishment of a causal 
relationship is not appropriate. Therefore, by drawing scatter plots and running a bivariate analysis for 
alternate years (2006, 2010 and 2014) as pretests, I may be able to establish a correlation between my 
independent and dependent variable of my first hypothesis. 
 
I will use the rule of law as a proxy for the degree of executive aggrandizement since the former is an 
aggregate of numerical classifications of the status of the separation of power, the independence of 
the judiciary, the prosecution of office abuse and civil rights. Separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary indicate the state of democratic checks and balances, hence, constraints 
on the executive, in the 11 CEE EU member states which are my unit of analysis. I use prosecution of 
office abuse as an indicator for accountability. Lastly, civil rights serves as my indicator for the 
protection of individual freedoms from government interferences. In sum, this operationalization of 
the rule of law comprises factors which are all essential to my conceptualization of democratic 
backsliding as executive aggrandizement.  
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My independent variable is a composite of indicators provided by the USAID CSO sustainability index 
for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (2015). To determine the degree of CSO sustainability, an 
expert panel was instructed to assess various factors relating to CSO involvement in policy making 
processes and their perception / reception by the public. Instead of using the aggregate of all indicators 
for CSO sustainability, I use three indicators in order to generate my own composite variable. 
Organizational capacity serves as my first indicator as it captures CSOs’ ability to engage in governance 
and to become involved in issues of their concern. The second indicator is advocacy of CSOs. This 
captures CSOs’ record in influencing public policy and therefore their ability to articulate their 
positions. Moreover, this indicator also assesses the general political and advocacy environment CSOs 
operate within. My third indicator is the public image of CSOs, thus how positively/negatively they are 
viewed by governments, businesses and the public. Instead of naming the aggregate CSO 
sustainability, I decided to frame it as CSO weakness for the purpose of a clear understanding of the 
scaling used. Hence, high scores for CSO weakness represent very weak CSO environments.  
 
The USAID CSO sustainability index is composed of seven indicators. I chose to exclude some and 
calculate a new aggregate based on careful considerations  to avoid tautologies with the rule of law 
indicators used. For this reason I excluded the indicator legal environment and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, for instance, the indicators financial viability and service provision also take into account, 
for instance, the recovery of costs from CSO support organizations which can be governmental as well.  
 
To successfully counter governmental power, CSOs need to have organizational capacities which 
enable them to, for instance, provide assessments of controversial legislation, educate citizens on 
issues of democracy to create necessary social capital, mobilize citizens for demonstrations and consult 
the government on upcoming legislation. The advocacy dimension of my variable also covers the 
capacity of CSOs to successfully enter and build coalitions with other like-minded organizations as well 
as to understand their ability to respond to salient topics (USAID, 2015, 265). This corresponds to one 
of the most vital functions of CSOs which have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In 
addition, CSOs need an environment which is conducive to their activities and does not obstruct their 
efforts. Hence, positive media coverage and a constructive perception of their work by the public are 
essential to build a constituency and be trusted to represent the constituency’s interest to decision 
makers at local and national levels.  
 
It is important to point out that both, the data from the Bertelsmann Transformation index as well as 
from the USAID CSO sustainability index are based on expert assessments. Therefore, the scores reflect 
the careful considerations of selected experts. It is for this reason, that these scores, for instance, differ 
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from other datasets from Freedom House or the World Justice Project which are also expert 
assessments.  
 
3.1.1. Overview of used rule of law indicators and what they measure (Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index) 
 
Indicator Definition Scale from 1 to 10 
Separation of 
powers 
Institutional differentiation and according 
division of labor between ministries and 
branches of government; most importantly 
an effective system of checks and balances 
Ranging from no separation of 
powers, neither de facto no de 
jure (1) to clear separation of 
powers with effective system of 
checks and balances (10) 
Independent 
judiciary 
An independent judiciary is free from 
improper influence, reviews and interprets 
legislation and policies autonomously, 
reason independently from influence of 
officials; the country developed a 
differentiated and professional judicial 
branch with functioning courts and 
administrations 
Ranging from non-independent 
judiciary with no institutional 
differentiation (1) to judiciary free 
from corruption and 
unconstitutional interventions; 
judiciary is fully differentiated, 
there are mechanisms for judicial 
review (10) 
Prosecution of 
office abuse 
Public servants and politicians are held 
accountable to the law; in case of 
misconduct, conflict of interests, corruption 
and other legal breaches; officials face 
public adversity in case of office abuse   
Ranging from no legal 
consequences or public adversity 
in case of office abuse by public 
servants (1) to the rigorous 
prosecution of those who break 
the law; in addition, office abuse 
causes public backlash (10) 
Civil Rights Protection of individual liberties against 
state and non-state actors; this includes 
right to life, prohibition of torture & cruel 
and inhumane treatment, protection of 
privacy; also includes principles such as 
equality before the law, due process, equal 
access to justice  
Ranging from systemic violations 
of civil rights and no institutions 
and laws to protect citizens from 
the state (1) to full codification of 
individual rights and effective 
mechanisms to address violations 
of liberties (10) 
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3.1.2. Overview of CSO weakness indicators (USAID CSO sustainability index: Central and Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia) 
 
Indicators Definition Scale from 1 to 7 
Organizational 
Capacity 
CSOs need to be able to identify 
and build local constituencies, 
have strategic plans outlining 
their mission, have a working 
internal management structure 
including competent staff 
equipped with up-to-date 
technical facilities 
Ranging from the establishment of several 
transparent and effective CSOs across 
different sectors, which are internally 
differentiated and have well trained staff (1) 
to CSOs being dependent on one or two 
people respectively, having no mission and 
strategies, no resources and are not building 
a constituency (7) 
Advocacy CSOs cooperate with local and 
national governments on policy 
issues, set up policy initiatives to 
pursue their interests, lobby to 
have their interest heard by 
decision makers; CSO 
community is aware of the 
architecture of a favorable legal 
infrastructure and consequently 
pool efforts to lobby for its 
establishment  
Ranging from CSOs being responsive to the 
concerns of their constituencies and the 
country, ability to build coalitions to achieve 
policy goals, mobilization of citizens (1) to the 
existence of some broad movements with 
little self-organization, citizens are generally 
passive and CSO activists are afraid to engage 
with the government, CSOs do not 
understand the gravity of the role they can 
play in the policy making process (7) 
Public Image  CSOs receive positive and 
supportive media coverage, the 
public has a positive perception 
of CSOs activities; business and 
governments have a positive 
idea of CSOs and therefore are 
open to cooperation; CSOs 
effectively publicize their 
activities; CSOs are transparent 
and operate ethically  
Ranging from deeply rooted public trust in 
the abilities of CSOs, many good examples for 
constructive and productive partnerships 
with local and national government exist, 
private-public initiatives are welcomed by 
authorities, CSOs are accountable and 
transparent (1) to the public and / or the 
government being suspicious and 
uninformed about the activities of CSOs, 
governments and people are not aware of the 
importance of organized non-state actors, 
hostile media coverage (7) 
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Attention: The scale for Rule of Law performance goes from 1, symbolizing a very weak to non-existent 
rule of law to 10 which represents a very strong and well protected rule of law. The scale for CSO 
weakness goes from 1, representing a strong CSO environment to 7 which embodies  
 
 
3.2. Stage 2: Going in depth with comparative case studies  
 
The second stage of my empirical analysis consists of a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) of several outcome enabling variables. Crisp set QCA only allows for the dichotomization of a 
certain condition, thus indicate membership (1) and non-membership (2). However, fuzzy-sets enable 
the researcher to indicate partial membership as well. There are different types of fuzzy-sets, e.g. three 
value, four value or six value fuzzy sets and ultimately continuous fuzzy sets, whereas the latter is 
characterized by the value 1 indicating full membership, 0.5 indicating full ambiguity (the case under 
investigation is neither in nor out of the condition) and finally 0 indicating no membership in the 
condition. Non-continuous fuzzy sets are useful if the researcher needs to address shortcomings or 
gaps in his data, for instance that specific data is missing for one case while it is given for all others. 
Yet, as all indicators used for my subsequent empirical analysis are obtained without gaps for all eleven 
cases, a continuous fuzzy set is appropriate. It should be noted, that (continuous) fuzzy set values do 
not merely indicate a ranking of cases relative to each other, but rather “pinpoint qualitative states 
while at the same time assessing varying degrees of membership between full inclusion and full 
exclusion” (Ragin, 2010, 90). 
 
Generally, QCA allows for the identification of so-called multiple conjunctural causation. This allows 
for causal complexity and supports different paths in guiding the researcher to different configurations 
of causal conditions and ultimately, the outcome (condition). Moreover, to deal with causal complexity 
in an efficient and comprehensive manner, the distinction of necessary and sufficient conditions is 
useful (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, 753). A causal condition is a necessary cause of the outcome if 
the outcome never occurs without its presence. Thus, when the outcome is observed, the specific 
condition must be present as well. Sufficiency implies that whenever we see a causal condition, the 
outcome is observable too. However, the outcome can occur without the presence of the sufficient 
condition. Statements regarding sufficiency and necessity of causal conditions imply varying subset 
relations between causal and outcome conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 755). For each causal 
condition that has been identified as only necessary for the outcome to occur, “instances of the 
outcome will form a subset of instances of the causal condition” (Ragin, 2000, 213).  
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3.2.1. Operationalization of outcome conditions 
 
It is evident that in order to conduct a qualitative comparative analysis, additional causal factors need 
to be included in the empirical analysis. This is due to the aforementioned identification of potential 
combinations of causal factors, and provides a means of controlling for confounding variables.  
 
CSO weakness plays an important role as I will show in the first stage of my empirical analysis. Based 
on literature on democratic backsliding and the rule of law I decided to include only three more 
conditions. These can be clearly distinguished from the operationalization of the rule of law: public 
distrust in institutions (local and central governments, courts), anti-corruption policies, and external 
actor involvement.  
 
3.2.1.1. Public Trust in Political Institutions 
Public trust in political institutions is measured by Indicators which are composed of responses to 
interview questions on how much trust the respondents place in the national parliaments 
(Eurobarometer, 2014, 64). Thus, the indicator on public trust of political institutions is perception 
based. 
 
3.2.1.2. Perception of Corruption  
The public’s general perception of corruption matters as it influences citizens’ willingness and 
eagerness to participate in decision-making processes or engage in civic dialogues. This indicator is 
composed of Eurobarometer research, particularly highlighting if interviewees respond positively to 
corruption being widespread in his/her country. Because this is also a perception indicator it does not 
necessarily represent the real degree of corruption in the respective countries.  
 
3.2.1.3. External Actor Involvement  
I included a dummy variable for the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) by which the 
European Commission monitors efforts by newly acceded member states to meet standards in the 
fields of security freedom and justice, and the functioning of the internal market which have not been 
met until the closing of the accession negotiations. The legality of the CVM is set forth under Article 
37 and 39 of the Accession Treaty for Romania and Bulgaria (European Union, 2005, Art. 37 & 39). For 
Croatia, I included a dummy variable for all years from 2006 to 2014, as the official screening for all 
chapters of the acquis began in 2006 which were then opened from 2008 onwards.  Even though by 
2011 all chapters were closed, the impact of the accession negotiations remains pivotal for several 
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years after accession. Experience with prior waves of accession have shown that in preceding years, 
the new member states are champions of compliance with EU standards (Dimitrova & Toshkov, 2009, 
2). Accession negotiations constitute a significantly stronger external actor involvement as the CVM. 
This is due to accession conditionality depending on the complete legislative implementation of the 80 
000-page EU acquis. It is only the EU that controls all leverage on Croatia during the accession 
negotiations and as a result its implications are felt long after. Thus, Croatia receives a score of 1 for 
external actor involvement, while Romania and Bulgaria, bot subject to the CVM receive a 0.5. All other 
countries are not in the set of countries with strong external actor involvement, hence the remaining 
eight countries receive a 0 for this conditional variable.  
 
3.2.2. Overview Outcome and Causal Conditions  
 
 Condition Definition Source 
Outcome Rule of Law 
performance 
The rule of law is upheld if the separation of 
powers is given, the judiciary can operate 
free from undue influence from branches of 
government or non-state actors, e.g. 
business; corruption is not widespread, 
office holders are equally held accountable 
to the law and civil rights are protected.  
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
2014 
Causal CSO 
Weakness 
CSOs do not engage in constituency building, 
have weak managerial structures, fail to 
respond to current issues, do not pursue a 
coherent policy agenda, are perceived 
negatively by the public and receive little or 
negative coverage by the media  
USAID 2015 CSO 
sustainability index for 
Europe and Eurasia  
Causal 
 
External Actor 
Involvement 
Involvement of the EU in domestic affairs 
concerning the rule of law by means of the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM), accession negotiations (only for 
Croatia)  
 
Causal Perception of 
Corruption  
Perception of citizens on how widespread 
corruption is in the member state of their 
nationality (perception based indicator) 
Special Eurobarometer 
report on Corruption 
(2014) 
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Causal 
 
Trust in 
national 
parliaments 
Degree of trust citizens of EU member states 
place in their national parliaments  
Eurobarometer, Spring 
Edition 2014 
 
3.2.3. Theoretical Considerations and Calibration  
 
For the execution of my comparative qualitative empirical analysis with the fs QCA software by Ragin 
(2014), the raw data obtained for my various causal and outcome conditions need to be calibrated. As 
calibration is a methodological step typically used in the natural sciences, it can also be applicable to 
social science research. In fact, it is especially useful for research on democratic consolidation (Ragin, 
2007, 1). An uncalibrated measure of democracy tells the researcher how the cases under investigation 
relate to each other. However, the uncalibrated measure cannot be specific about single cases and 
their tendencies towards authoritarianism or democracy. Thus, calibration embodies the intersection 
of theory and empirical analysis. 
 
To decide on membership or non-membership in a particular condition, the researcher has to define 
the tip-over point, or the point of full ambiguity on the scale of e.g. the rule of law. In other words, he 
needs to determine, with reason, when a country upholds the rule of law fully or when there are 
substantial breaches that exclude the country from the set of countries with a high rule of law 
performance. Fuzzy sets appear rather simple as merely displaying the degree of membership to a 
certain set (condition) on a scale between 0 and 1, indicating full inclusion or full exclusion respectively 
(Ragin, 9). The tip-over point on a usual interval scale would be 0,5. However, for fuzzy set QCA it is 
useful to carefully consider the specific point of full ambiguity. For instance, reasoning with 
conventional wisdom, the point of full ambiguity for rule of law performance (scale 10 – 0) is 5,5. Yet, 
a rule of law score of 5,5 would include countries in the set of high rule of law performance that 
experience frequent interferences in the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary or 
widespread corruption. Nevertheless, the country would receive a score of 7 due to measurement of 
the specific indicators undertaken by the researchers of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Hence, 
in the following I am going to carefully discuss my calibration based on theory and measurement of 
indicators.  
 
Perception of Corruption 
The data for perception of corruption is taken from the European Commission’s special report on 
corruption from 2014. The reports presented intriguing results and demonstrated generally very high 
levels of perceived corruption amongst most EU member states. 76% of all respondents indicate a 
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perception of widespread corruption in their country of citizenship (European Commission, 2014). 
Even in EU member states with active civil society and high rule of law performance, perception of 
corruption remains relatively high (e.g. Estonia: 65%), despite the actual level of corruption in these 
countries being significantly lower. Full membership in the condition perception of corruption 
constitutes the maximum score from all CEE EU member states, 94%. 65%, the lowest score from CEE 
EU, indicates full non-membership. The mean of all eleven cases, 87,36% indicates full ambiguity.  
 
 Trust in National Parliaments 
On average, 28% of EU citizens tend to trust their national parliaments. 67% of Swedish citizens 
trusting their national parliament, however only 6% of Slovenian respondents indicated the same. The 
mean for all CEE EU member states is even lower than the EU average: 19.55%. This score indicates 
the tip-over point separating members and non-members in this causal condition. Full membership 
constitutes the maximum score in CEE EU of 42% trusting the national parliament and full non-
membership is indicated by 6% trusting the national parliament.  
 
External Actor Involvement 
The first indicator for external actor involvement, the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification 
(CVM) or recently concluded accession negotiations with the EU, does not demand calibration. All 
countries directly receive a calibrated score from me. Croatia is included in the condition, having 
received a score of 1 for the recent accession negotiations which, even though concluded in 2011, 
remain highly salient as previous accession experiences suggest. Bulgaria and Romania receive a 0.5 
as they are subject to the CVM. The score implies neither full inclusion, nor full exclusion from the set 
of countries with external actor involvement. As the CVM does not give the European Commission 
similar levels of leverage as accession negotiations do, their score is lower than Croatia’s. The 
remaining eight countries are fully excluded from this condition as no significant external actor 
involvement can be noted.  
 
 CSO Weakness  
The scores for CSO weakness are distributed on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 indicating a very active and well 
regarded civil society and 7 displaying a completely deteriorated civil society, without constituencies, 
policy agendas and organizational capacities. The scales used by the experts of the USAID CSO 
sustainability index can be separated into three sections: 1 – 3 (sustainability enhanced), 3 – 5 
(sustainability evolving) and 5 – 7 (sustainability impeded).  Even though the sustainability terminology 
used in the report and index is slightly confusing, the methodological separation of the scale is helpful. 
Scores from 3 – 5 indicate CSO activities that are not always adequate as a response to, for instance, 
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improper governmental agendas (USAID, 2015, 268). Moreover, the theoretical discussion of chapter 
two clarified, that to function as a strong counter weight to the government, in other words informal 
checks and balances, CSOs need to have considerable organizational capacities, constituencies and an 
environment that is conducive to their activities. The latter refers to supportive media coverage and 
general support of the public for their activities. When this is not given CSOs have great difficulties to 
first establish policy agendas responsive to their constituencies and second, to pursue those set out 
goals. Hence, on the CSO Weakness scale, 3.0 defines the point of full ambiguity and separates the 
cases into members to the set (3 – 7) and non-membership (1 – 3).  
 
Rule of Law Performance 
The rule of law and its indicators are distributed on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 displaying full rule of law 
protection and compliance and 1 no rule of law, neither de facto nor de jure.  It should be remarked 
that all EU member states, including the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, score 
relatively high in the BTI for the rule of law. Reports and data sets, such as the Freedom House Country 
reports or its Nation in Transit (NIT) reports as well as the index of the World Justice Project indicate 
similar levels as those displayed in the BTI.  
 
Nevertheless, countries, such as Croatia, receive a decent score of 8.5 in the BTI (or a 12/16 from 
Freedom House for the same year), while they still suffer from significant shortcomings in the fight 
against corruption or in the protection of civil rights (Doric, 2014, 186). Thus, despite profound efforts 
undertaken to meet the Copenhagen criteria and implement the full acquis prior to accession, it would 
not be scientifically appropriate to rank Croatia as a regime with membership in the set of countries 
that fully adheres to the rule of law. These issues are similar to problems other CEE countries are facing. 
Despite considerable efforts and reforms in respects concerning the rule of law, other fields have 
remained largely unchanged. Thus, the tip-over point lies at 8.5, separating countries with membership 
and non-membership to the rule of law.  
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Overview calibrated conditions 
Overview of cutoff points 
Condition Full Membership Cross-over Point No Membership 
CORUPT 95 87.36 65 
TRUSTNATIONAL 42 19.55 6 
CVM_ACCESS 1 0.5 0 
CSOWEAK 3.63 2.87 2.03 
RULEOFLAW 9.8 8.55 7.30 
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Here, you find an overview of all causal conditions. The fs value indicates the calibrated score based on prior considerations.  
 
 
Data matrix showing original variables and fuzzy set membership scores
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4. Empirical Analysis  
 
My empirical analysis is twofold. The first step involves establishing a correlation between my 
independent variable of interest, CSO weakness and my dependent variable, rule of law performance. 
Thus, the first step corresponds to my first hypothesis. The second step encompasses an analysis of 
the combinations of factors leading to high or low rule of law performance, by means of fuzzy set 
quantitative comparative analysis. Therefore, the second step corresponds to my second hypothesis 
and its sub-hypotheses.  
 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The summary of the quantitative data provided by descriptive statistics analysis supplements the 
conclusions reached by the subsequent covariate analysis, constituting the first step in my empirical 
analysis. Here, it should be stated that the results display a slight increase of the standard deviation 
for rule of law performance from 2006 to 2014 and a small decrease in the mean for rule of law 
performance. For two of the three additional causal conditions: perception of corruption and trust in 
national parliaments, it is evident that the mean is closer to high perception of corruption and low 
trust in national parliaments. This is illustrated in table 4.1.1. below. This is due to all cases of these 
two indicators being located above 50% for perception of corruption and below 50% for trust in 
national parliaments. Be aware, that these results of the descriptive statistics conducted with SPSS 
software are the basis for the calibration carefully conducted in the previous chapter of this thesis.    
 
4.1.1. Rule of Law and CSO Weakness 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Values for 2006 
Rule of Law 11 7.30 9.50 8.7727 0.71895 
CSO Weakness 11 2.13 4.10 2.9055 0.61032 
Valid N 11         
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Values for 2010 
Rule of Law 11 7.80 9.80 8.9182 0.65241 
CSO Weakness 11 2.13 4.10 2.9055 0.61032 
Valid N 11         
Values for 2014 
Rule of Law 11 7.30 9.80 8.5545 0.77764 
CSO Weakness 11 2.03 3.63 2.8673 0.59358 
Valid N 11         
 
 
4.1.2. Additional Causal Conditions  
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Values for 2014 
CORUPT 11 65.00 95.00 87.3636 8.80 
TRUST NATIONAL 11 6.0 42.00 19.5455 9.95 
CVM_ACCESS 11 0 1 0.1818 0.337 
Valid N 11         
 
 
4.2. Rule of Law and CSO Weakness in CEE EU Member states 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 present the relationship between the rule of law and CSO sustainability of the 11 
CEE EU member states in 2006, 2010 and 2014 respectively. By taking a snapshot from three different 
points in time, I can observe both the general relationship of the two variables and the development 
of the eleven countries over a limited period of time. High scores for the rule of law indicate a strong 
separation of power, high judicial independence, strong protection of civil rights and rigorous 
prosecution of officials who break the law (scale from 1 – 10). Low scores of the aggregate of three 
CSO sustainability indicators indicate an enhancement of CSO sustainability, while high scores indicate 
an impediment (Scale 1 – 7).  
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Figure 1: 2006 Rule of Law and CSO Weakness in CEE EU Member States 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 2010 Rule of Law and CSO Weakness in CEE EU Member States 
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The scatter plots indicate that both variables are negatively correlated. Utilizing a simple regression 
analysis, I find that for 2006 and 2014, the bivariate correlation coefficient is -0,79. Moreover, R-
Squared = 0,63 indicating that the results are statistically significant. Figure 2, however, does not show 
a strong relationship between the two variables of interest. The bivariate correlation coefficient is -
0,18 and R-Squared = 0,033. The biggest outlier in 2010 is Slovenia with a very high score on the rule 
of law and a high score on CSO sustainability. When conducting another simple regression without 
Slovenia’s scores the correlation coefficient shows a strong relationship of -0,69 and R-Squared = 0,49.  
 
Interestingly, we can observe countries increasing their rule of law position from 2006 to 2014. The 
better (or lower) their scores on CSO sustainability, the better their rule of law performance. 
Particularly, this can be observed in Estonia and Czech Republic. In other CEE EU member states a 
decrease in CSO sustainability (in the scatter plots an increase in the CSO aggregate score) is also 
followed by a decrease in rule of law performance. This is the case for Hungary and Slovakia. Other 
countries experience only minor changes in one of the variables or remain constant over the course of 
these eight years. Slovenia remains an outlier, since from 2006 to 2014 its CSO sustainability improves 
while rule of law performance slightly decreases.  
 
Figure 3: 2014 Rule of Law and CSO Weakness in CEE EU Member States 
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The statistical significance of the correlation between the rule of law and CSO sustainability indicates 
that there are other important variables influencing our case study’s rule of law performance. To 
explore the relevance of those factors on the outcome, and investigate what factors in combination 
with CSO sustainability are pivotal to democratic consolidation, I will conduct a fsQCA in the second 
part of my empirical analysis. 
 
Conversely, it should be remarked that the results differ from Greskovits’ study of hollowing and 
backsliding in CEE EU member states from 2015. For instance, he ascribes low levels of hollowing to 
Hungary by combining civil society scores from Freedom House’s Nation in Transit study and data on 
trust in NGOs. In addition, he combines the  data on electoral turnout and party membership. 
However, data from the CSO sustainability index show a different result. Instead, Hungary shows 
decreases in both CSO sustainability and in its rule of law performance.  
 
Another puzzling outcome is that the rule of law scores for Slovenia are much better than other 
assessments demonstrate. For instance, the European Court for Human Rights ranks Slovenia first, 
amongst all countries which are part of the European Convention for Human Rights, with the highest 
number of human rights violations per capital. Moreover, the court points out how poorly reformed 
the Slovenian justice system is even though the particular score for judicial independence from the BTI 
indicates a judiciary that is fully independent from external interferences. 
 
 
4.3. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
4.3.1. Constructing Fuzzy Sets 
 
Fuzzy sets differ from crisp sets in one crucial dimension: fuzzy sets allow for partial membership 
instead of merely dichotomizing membership. In the study of fuzzy sets, the subset relations are 
probably the most interesting aspects revealed by thorough empirical analysis. Subset relations are 
combinations of conditions and can be conceptualized as a multidimensional vector space (Ragin, 2007, 
100). This space has 2k corners, whereas k is the total number of conditions included in the fsQCA.  
 
Thus, for the four conditions included in my empirical analysis, there are 16 logically possible 
configurations. However, this does not imply that all combinations of sets are relevant or even 
empirically possible. Moreover, it is technically not possible to conduct the analysis including the 
scores for external actor involvement (0, 0.5, 1). The fs QCA software does not allow for the calculation 
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of a logical AND operation with scores indicating full exclusion of a condition (thus 0). Logical AND 
operations are necessary to calculate membership in a specific combination of conditions. Scores for 
the eight countries fully excluded from the set of external actor involvement, the membership scores 
would be 0.0 as well. The fsQCA software is only able to indicate and analyze partial memberships in 
sets. Thus, to not commit omitted variable bias by simply excluding the causal variable external actor 
involvement from the entire empirical analysis, I will bring the variable back into the assessment when 
subset and superset relations are subsequently analyzed.  
 
For reasons of feasibility, I run a truth table analysis only for the three remaining causal conditions as 
crisp conditions (perception of corruption, trust in national parliaments and CSO weakness). The truth 
table then indicates the distribution of cases amongst the 8 possible causal configurations for the 
absence of rule of law as the outcome condition (~rule of law). The ~ sign symbolizes the absence of a 
condition. Moreover, it should be noted that each row of the truth table, which constitutes a 
configuration of conditions, directly corresponding to a corner in the multidimensional vector space 
(Ragin, 103).  
 
Truth table for ~rule of law as the outcome condition 
 
Out of the 8 configurations, 3 are rendered as logical remainders with no cases holding a degree of 
membership higher than 0.5 attributed to these configurations. For the time being, these initial 
remainders can be disregarded. I will return to the logical remainders as potential counterfactuals 
when identifying the parsimonious and intermediate solutions. It is important to mention that when 
Country CSOWEAK CORUPT TRUST 
N Cases with > 0.5 
membership 
Consistency as a 
subset of ~ 
RULEOFLAW 
Bulgaria 1 0 0 1 1 
Hungary 1 1 1 1 0.99 
Croatia, Romania, 
Slovenia 
1 1 0 3 0.82 
Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Slovakia 
0 1 0 3 0.66 
Estonia, Poland, 
Latvia 
0 0 1 3 0.54 
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analyzing fuzzy sets, each case can hold some degree of membership in each causal combination. All 
11 cases are distributed amongst five different causal configurations.  
 
To identify different configurations leading to low rule of law performance, it is necessary to select a 
consistency cutoff value to recode the outcome condition. The higher the cutoff value, the higher the 
final consistency of the subset with the negation of the rule of law. Generally, a cutoff point lower than 
0.75 should not be selected as cases can be increasingly inconsistent with the final outcome. Therefore, 
my cutoff value of 0.82 should demonstrate high consistency of the causal conditions for Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia as a subset for the absence of a strong rule of law. Usually, 
the higher the consistency the lower the coverage of a configuration. The coverage score which is also 
calculated by the software using Boolean mathematics indicates how many cases displaying the 
outcome are represented by this particular configuration (Elliot, 2013, 5). In addition, the researcher 
needs to determine a frequency threshold according to the number of cases he is analyzing (Ragin, 
2008, 108). In my research, I am dealing with 11 cases. Thus, as the number of cases analyzed is small, 
the threshold is set at 1, meaning that configurations which display membership by at least one case 
are taken into consideration for my subsequent analysis.  
 
It is evident that Slovenia’s rule of law score renders the country excluded from the set of countries 
with low rule of law performance (~rule of law = 0.25), while its membership score in the subset of 
CSO weakness, high perception of corruption and no trust in national parliaments is significantly higher 
(CSOWEAK*CORUPT*~TRUST = 0.81). In addition, there are two more contradictory configurations 
when looking at the membership and the rule of law score for Slovakia and Latvia. Both countries are 
in the set of rule of law breakdown countries, yet share the same causal configuration as four countries 
with a strong rule of law. Ragin (2008, 48) suggests several strategies for dealing with contradictory 
findings. For example, adding more conditions to the analysis may complicate the causal model or 
induce change to the calibration strategy. Several options have been considered, but factually re-
calibrating scores for civil society or rule of law does not make sense. Rule of law scores and civil society 
scores for Slovakia and Latvia are very similar to the results of Freedom House’s country reports and 
Nation in Transit reports. Adding causal conditions would not resolve the issue either, as the problem 
lies in the configuration of below average CSO weakness scores and above average rule of law scores.  
 
Instead of excluding the three configurations from my analysis, I will exclude the three cases from the 
subsequent analysis. The three causal configurations of each case will be briefly explained in a 
qualitative-historical manner in section three of this chapter. 
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4.3.2. Investigating causal configurations 
 
I will now calculate the degree of membership of each case (country) in the respective causal 
configuration. Combination of conditions are executed by use of a so called logical AND operation for 
fuzzy set QCA (Ragin, 2007, 96). Out of the eight possible causal configurations, each case can only 
have one combination with a membership score > 0.5. This is characteristic to logical AND fuzzy set 
operations.  
 
There are four countries in the set of ~rule of law: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Hungary.  Four cases 
are distributed amongst three different paths: 
 
(CSOWEAK and ~CORUPT and ~TRUST) or (CSOWEAK and CORUPT and TRUST) or (CSOWEAK and 
CORUPT and ~TRUST) -> ~RULEOFLAW 
 
These three paths can be simplified into two causal combinations constituting a subset to ~rule of law. 
Both solutions correspond to the intermediate solution calculated by use of Boolean mathematics by 
the fs QCA software. Mind, that this is a procedure also known to the analysis of crisp set memberships. 
Therefore, both solutions do not indicate any specific degree of membership, other than all cases 
displaying full membership in the set. Degrees of membership between 0.5 and 1 are all equaled to 1 
(full inclusion) using crisp sets.   
 
The intermediate solution:  
 
(CSOWEAK and CORUPT) or (CSOWEAK and ~TRUST) -> ~RULEOFLAW 
 
 
Both, the complex solution and the intermediate solution can still be additionally reduced one, to the 
most parsimonious solution using Boolean mathematics: 
 
CSOWEAK -> ~RULEOFLAW 
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Table of causal configurations with case membership > 0.5 
 
Country EXTERNAL CORUPT TRUST CSOWEAK RULEOFLAW 
~CSOWEAK*
CORUPT*~T
RUST 
CSOWEAK*
CORUPT*~
TRUST 
CSOWEAK*
CORUPT*T
RUST 
CSOWEAK*~
CORUPT*~T
RUST 
~CSOWEAK*
~CORUPT*T
RUST 
Estonia 0 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.95 
Poland 0 0.27 0.52 0.07 0.86 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.52 
Latvia 0 0.36 0.55 0.3 0.35 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.30 0.55 
Bulgaria 0.5 0.39 0.23 0.86 0.21 0.14 0.39 0.23 0.61 0.14 
Hungary 0 0.66 0.86 0.93 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.66 0.14 0.07 
Slovakia 0 0.74 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.26 
Slovenia 0 0.81 0.05 0.93 0.75 0.07 0.81 0.05 0.19 0.05 
Romania 0.5 0.9 0.31 0.95 0.07 0.05 0.69 0.31 0.10 0.05 
Croatia 1 0.93 0.23 0.79 0.35 0.21 0.77 0.23 0.07 0.07 
Czech 
Republic 
0 0.95 0.27 0.16 0.86 0.73 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05 
Lithuania 0 0.95 0.27 0.17 0.65 0.73 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.05 
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4.3.3. The role of external actor involvement  
 
It is now appropriate to bring back the causal condition external actor involvement into the analysis to 
further differentiate the four cases of ~rule of law. Three of the four countries scored partial or full 
membership in the set of countries with external actor involvement: 
 
Fuzzy set membership truth table 
 
Country CSOWEAK CORUPT NATION CVM_ACCESS 
Bulgaria 0.86 0.39 0.23 0.5 
Hungary 0.93 0.66 0.86 0 
Croatia 0.79 0.93 0.23 1 
Romania 0.95 0.9 0.31 0.5 
 
 
It is interesting to observe that despite Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania’s strong involvement of external 
actors, these countries hold relatively low rule of law performance. When Romania and Bulgaria 
acceded to the EU in 2007, both countries still lacked considerable progress in fields relating to the 
rule of law (Vachudova & Spendzharova, 2012, 2). Prior progress in many areas of the acquis was 
profound and consequently EU elites agreed to letting Romania and Bulgaria accede without having 
achieved all goals set forth in the chapters of the acquis (Vachudova & Spendzharova, 2). As a result, 
the European Commission established the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as a tool to 
exercise pressure on these countries for further reform. However, due to little leverage on the EU’s 
side, the CVM remained relatively ineffective until Romania and Bulgaria were rejected to join the 
Schengen area. As a result, the Commission tied the countrys’ Schengen membership to the fulfillment 
of the CVM criteria. This equipped the Commission with the needed leverage on Romania and Bulgaria. 
Furthermore, in the 2012 interim report on the developments initiated by the CVM, the European 
Commission called for a greater involvement of civil society for monitoring and aiding progress in the 
judiciary and the fight against corruption in both countries (for Romania: European Commission, 2012, 
2 / for Bulgaria: European Commission, 2012, 3). This corresponds to the profound necessity of 
domestic pressure the CVM needs for working effectively as identified by Vachudova et al (2012). 
Schengen membership is very favorable in the eyes of the public in both countries; thus, public 
pressure could potentially bridge the current deficits of civil society. Lastly, two issues should be 
addressed. First, the fact of Romania and Bulgaria remaining subject to the CVM years after its 
initiation demonstrates its limited effectiveness as well as the severe rule of law deficits that were not 
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adequately addressed prior to accession (Pech, 2016, 12). Second, the CVM itself has also been subject 
of profound criticism as it issues rather broad rule of law recommendations instead of specific 
institutional and normative guidelines (Ioannidis, 2015, 18). 
 
It is not evident that the recent accession negotiations with Croatia, thus strong external actor 
involvement, have contributed to a consolidation of the rule of law in the youngest EU member state. 
When the EU and Croatia signed the accession treaty in 2011, it was apparent that Croatia still dealt 
with severe shortcomings relating to the rule of law, e.g. a corrupt judiciary, an ineffective criminal 
justice system as well as little checks and balances on different branches of government (Agrast et al, 
2011, 55). Despite these shortcomings, the EU did not subject Croatia to the CVM to continue to 
exercise pressure and kept leverage on the new member state. This was partly due to the EU wanting 
to demonstrate that they had learnt from the previous wave of accession and the subsequent 
problems that were caused by Romania and Bulgaria not having met rule of law standards upon 
accession (Pech, 2016, 12). In addition, Croatia’s bid for membership was motivated and strongly 
supported by Germany’s and Austria’s lobbying efforts (Pech, 12).  
 
To be clear, the CVM was initiated to address shortcomings concerning the rule of law in Bulgaria and 
Romania. Thus, from these findings one cannot conclude that the CVM is a causal factor for low rule 
of law performance. The CVM as well as the accession negotiation between Croatia and the EU might 
therefore have a mediating or mitigating function. 
 
 
4.3.4. Explaining different levels of trust 
 
Hungary is an outlier with citizens displaying trust in their national parliament. Trust in the national 
parliament is otherwise only present in Estonia which has a strong civil society and a strong rule of law. 
In three cases (Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania) no trust in political institutions correlates with the weakness 
of civil society organizations, while in five cases the absence of trust in national parliaments is 
associated with a strong civil society (Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic). These results 
are as inconclusive as is the state of theoretical and empirical research on the role of political trust for 
political participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013, 132). Nonetheless, it may be insightful to identify the 
reasons for relatively high trust in national parliaments in Hungary. 
 
In 2012, the Commission had initiated several infringement procedures against the Hungarian 
government in response to reforms of the judiciary, the national bank and data protection regulations 
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(Varnagy, 2013, 96). However, it was not the reforms but the intervention of the Commission which 
caused a widespread domestic public backlash. Hundreds of thousands pro-government protesters 
went to the streets to protest the Euro-colonialism president Victor Orban accused Brussels of. Even 
though citizens’ support for the European parliament remains stronger than trust in the Hungarian 
parliament, Orban “did not only manage to survive during economically hard times and despite severe 
criticism from the outside, but he seems to have succeeded in fundamentally changing public 
perceptions of the domestic institutions in a positive way” (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017, 359). Opinion 
polls underline this argument and demonstrate how sharply public support for domestic institutions 
rose under Orban’s government (Schlipphak & Treib, 360). 
 
Country ~RULEOFLAW 
CSOWEAK*CORUPT*T
RUST 
CSOWEAK*CORUPT*~
TRUST 
CSOWEAK*~CORUPT*~
TRUST 
Bulgaria 0.79 0.23 0.39 0.61 
Croatia 0.65 0.23 0.77 0.07 
Hungary 0.95 0.66 0.14 0.14 
Romania 0.93 0.31 0.69 0.10 
 
 
4.3.5. Identifying necessary and sufficient conditions 
 
Even though all countries have varying degrees of memberships in the three causal configurations 
leading to low rule of law performance, all causal combinations share one important commonality. 
That being the weakness of CSOs as a causal. If a causal condition can be considered a necessary 
condition for the outcome, it constitutes a superset of the outcome. In contrast, sufficient 
configurations of conditions are subsets of the outcome (Ragin, 2008, 110). To confirm CSO weakness 
as a necessary condition for low rule of law performance, it is useful to examine the consistency and 
coverage scores of the rule of law as a superset for rule of law breakdown (~rule of law). 
 
Condition consistency coverage combined 
CSOWEAK 0.937186 0.932500 0.955955 
 
Out of all possible configurations of all four causal conditions (including external actor involvement), 
CSO weakness displays the highest consistency score and coverage. Furthermore, both scores are 
considerably above the threshold of 0.75. To recap, consistency indicates to what extent membership 
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in a set of conditions forms a subset of the outcome. Coverage, however, reveals how much of the 
outcome is essentially covered by a condition or a set of conditions. 
 
Conditions consistency coverage combined 
CSOWEAK*CORUPT*TRUST 0.989362 0.465000 0.678491 
CSOWEAK*CORUPT*~TRUST 0.942623 0.575000 0.750666 
CSOWEAK*~CORUPT*~TRUST 1 0.285 0.531178 
 
This suggest that whenever rule of law breakdown in CEE EU member states is observed, we see 
weakness of civil society organizations as well. This corresponds to the most parsimonious solution 
identified above. In addition, there are three sufficient configurations of conditions: (CORUPT and 
TRUST) or (CORUPT and ~TRUST) or (~CORUPT and ~TRUST). It is evident due to the nature of a 
necessary condition, that CSO weakness is ultimately present to and consequently part of all three 
sufficient combinations.  
 
*Note that consistency, coverage and combined scores have been calculated by excluding Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Latvia. They only account for eight of the eleven cases under investigation due to the 
contradictory nature of their causal configurations. Also be aware that the above combinations only 
apply to eight CEE EU member states, thus not all countries of my analysis.  
 
 
4.3.6. Explaining the outliers 
 
Slovenia receives high scores for CSO weakness and its rule of law performance. Thus, the country is 
not in the set of countries displaying rule of law breakdown. It should also be noted, that Slovenia 
displayed a general upward trend of strength of civil society organizations in recent years, as 
demonstrated in part one’s the scatter plots. This is substantiated by the data used from the USAID 
CSO sustainability index (2015). Slovenia has a high number of registered CSOs relative to its number 
of citizens which are mostly active in culture, arts and sports, but not political issues (Lajh, 2015, 593). 
For many years in Slovenia a profound backlog of cases in the country’s courts hampered the rule of 
law (Lajh, 2015, 599). Two rulings from the European Court of Human Rights in 2013 increased the 
pressure on Slovenia as the country was infringing on Art. 6 of the ECHR granting the right to a fair trial 
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in due time. Simultaneously in 2013, the backlog of cases began to decline. In addition, the national 
government of Slovenia decided to further fund efforts to improve efficiency in the judiciary (Lajh, 
599). Obviously, there is more evidence to be uncovered for the progress the country’s progression 
regarding the rule of law. Nevertheless, the involvement of the ECHR as an external actor to the 
country’s domestic affairs is significant in respect of its rule of law performance.  
 
In Slovenia’s neighbor Slovakia, the rule of law faces a different challenge. There are many CSOs that 
are concerned with political issues and have the capacities to give meaningful input to policymaking 
processes. However, the government demonstrates unwillingness to involve and cooperate with 
NGOs. This is particularly prevalent in the context of human rights concerns. For instance, the 
government has been accused by the European Commission of political manipulation of the work of 
the Slovak National Center for Human Rights (Cunningham, 2015, 611). Moreover, the work of the 
Human Rights ombudswoman is often subject to politically motivated criticism and interference by the 
national government (Cunningham, 611). Nevertheless, the ombudswoman uncovered unjust 
treatment of prisoners in Slovakia as well as frequent and systematic human rights violations towards 
the country’s Roma minority (United States Department of State, 2015, 3). Thus, in Slovakia, civil 
society faces a government that is not very responsive to their concerns and denies cooperation, even 
though CSOs have necessary capacities. 
 
The third country which displayed contradictory findings is the Baltic nation of Latvia. The country was 
home to over 18 000 CSOs in 2014 with economic, social, cultural and political backgrounds (Bukovskis 
& Spruds, 2015, 377). CSOs  were frequently engaged in policymaking processes, however they lacked 
the capacities and know-how to contribute meaningful and substantial content (Bukovskis & Spruds, 
378). Nevertheless it is striking that CSO receive very positive media coverage and are also seen as a 
reliable source for information by citizens. Furthermore, the country’s judiciary works relatively 
independent from other branches of government, even though there were very few incidents that 
demonstrated interferences of the executive in judicial matters. It is also telling, that the country is 
plagued by corruption, a challenge officials do not seem to tackle effectively (Bukovskis & Spruds, 378. 
Latvia’s anti-corruption legislation which did make notable progress in 2014 nevertheless leaves 
significant areas untouched, such as lobbying transparency (Bukovskis & Spruds, 383). Hence, similar 
to the Slovenian experience, Latvia’s civil society is active and diversified, yet does not address rule of 
law shortcomings effectively by e.g. building coalitions with other concerned CSOs.  
 
There is more to uncover still than these three short paragraphs did. The analysis of civil society and 
rule of law interaction in Slovenia, Slovakia and Latvia probably deserves the scope of another three 
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theses. However, this brief exploration served the purpose to quickly identify some interesting 
dynamics that could potentially explain that despite a strong rule of law in Slovenia, CSOs are rather 
weak or that despite a vibrant civil society the rule of law still suffers considerable shortcomings in 
Slovakia and Latvia.  
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Summary of results  
 
H1: Weakness of civil society organizations is correlated with low levels of rule of law performance in 
CEE EU member states. 
The bivariate analysis of my empirical analysis demonstrates a strong negative correlation between 
the rule of law (dependent variable) and CSO weakness (independent variable). Therefore, I can 
conclude that for the medium n (n=11) of my analysis, the stronger CSO weakness levels are (meaning 
the weaker CSOs and the environment they operate within) the weaker the rule of law gets.  
 
H2: Weakness of civil society organizations in CEE EU member states is a necessary condition for low 
rule of law breakdown. 
The analysis of CSO weakness in combination with three causal conditions, external involvement, 
public trust and perception of corruption does not confirm that CSO weakness is a necessary condition 
for rule of law breakdown in Central and Eastern European EU member states. This is because rule of 
law scores of Latvia and Slovakia indicate membership in rule of law breakdown countries, yet both 
countries have vibrant civil societies and many registered and active CSOs.  
 
H2.1: External actor involvement, by means of the CVM or recent accession negotiations mitigates the 
negative effects of CSO weakness on rule of law performance. 
There is no significant evidence confirming this hypothesis. Three of the four countries displaying rule 
of law breakdown were also subject to external actor involvement. Yet, as stated in the prior chapter, 
one should not conclude that therefore external actor involvement functions as causal condition with 
negative effects on rule of law performance. The direction of causality cannot be established in this 
way, as for instance the CVM was created to specifically address shortcomings in respect of the rule of 
law in Bulgaria and Romania. However, the brief exploration of the Slovenian case proves highly 
interesting in this respect. Two rulings by the European Court of Human Rights increased pressure on 
the national government to uphold reform efforts in fields concerning the rule of law. It is possible that 
such involvement of external actors for instance attaches saliency to domestic issues that national 
CSOs can use to further push the government to further their reform agendas. The superficial 
exploration of these dynamics in my empirical chapter are not sufficient and should be investigated 
further. 
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H2.2: Low levels of public trust in political institutions in combination with CSO weakness is correlated 
with rule of law breakdown. 
Three of four cases with rule of law breakdown display low levels of public trust in national 
parliaments. However, it is also evident that the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia all display very 
low levels of public trust in national parliaments, yet they score fairly well on rule of law performance. 
In addition, these three countries also have relatively strong CSOs. Even though this does not confirm 
my hypothesis this result yields interesting as well as reassuring implications in respect of rule of law 
protection. Rule of law performance and trust of citizens in political institutions run in two different 
channels that do not seem to directly interact. Even when trust in the national parliament and the 
politicians therein is low, the judiciary functions separately.  
 
H2.3: High levels of perception of corruption in combination with CSO weakness has detrimental effects 
on rule of law performance.  
There is no evidence to confirm this hypothesis. All eleven CEE EU member states display levels of 
corruption above 50%. Specifically, seven cases are above the regional mean of 87,36%. Out of the 
breakdown countries it is only Bulgaria and Latvia that are below the regional mean. The fuzzy scores 
for trust in national parliaments and corruption do not directly correspond. Yet, when looking at the 
raw data for trust and perception of corruption (see calibration table on p. 25), it is evident that the 
lower levels of corruption are, the higher trust in national parliaments is.  
 
 
5.2. Final conclusions 
 
The impact of civil society organizations on the rule of law in CEE EU member states is not clear cut. 
The fs QCA indicates that the absence of strong CSOs impairs the rule of law in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary and Romania. However, there are two cases, Latvia and Slovakia that have a relatively weak 
rule of law and a rather strong civil society. Nevertheless, the raw data on CSO weakness and the rule 
of law displays a strong correlation linking weak CSOs to low levels of rule of law. Therefore, to some 
extent CSOs do function as a counterweight to the government, checking its actions and when 
necessary facilitates critical responses by citizens. This watchdog function does work in some cases. 
However, my empirical analysis demonstrates that CSOs are not the only game in town having an 
impact on the rule of law. Specifically, the Slovakian experience shows that it is a two-way street: CSOs 
also need an environment that gives space to their input and does not willfully obstruct their 
endeavors. It is the task of future research to investigate the dynamics of these outliers more in detail.  
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5.3. Relevance of findings & Generalizability  
 
This thesis’ approach differs from other works on backsliding and hollowing of consolidated 
democracies. In my theoretical framework, I drew a sharp line between political society and civil 
society which was taken seriously by the operationalization of my variables. The data on civil society 
by BTI differs from e.g. Greskovits (2015) study on hollowing and backsliding. Greskovits attested 
Hungary a vibrant civil society, yet he admitted that CSOs in the country are managed and financed 
largely by the two main political parties JOBBIK and FIDESZ. However, to avoid diffusion of terminology, 
it should not be characterized as civil society but as political society. Political society cannot fulfill 
fundamental functions of civil society, e.g. to effectively and critically monitor governmental efforts to 
undercut democracies. This is noticeable for instance, as there was little resistance to electoral reforms 
pushed by Orban after his 2010 election victory.  
 
This theoretical distinction is important to be taken seriously by coming studies on civil studies and its 
role for the rule of law and the consolidation of democracies. Even more important is the evidence 
found on civil society’s positive role for the rule of law in CEE EU member states. I failed to establish 
civil society weakness to be a necessary condition for rule of law breakdown. Nonetheless, I 
demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between CSO weakness and rule of law 
breakdown. Thus, this provides some meat to the academic discourse on democracy and rule of law 
promotion which has until now been largely theoretical.  
 
 
5.4. Implications for political action  
 
Future strategies of the European Union as an external actor for rule of law and democracy 
consolidation in CEE EU member states should indeed focus more on the strengthening of the 
organizational capacities of CSOs to improve their ability to provide meaningful input to policymaking 
processes. Moreover, increased organizational capacities enhance CSOs potentials to build effective 
coalitions and feed critical information on government activities to the public. It is also key to 
successfully empowering citizens in affected countries by identifying mechanism by which external 
pressure can facilitate endeavors of domestic CSOs.  
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5.5. Suggestion for further research 
 
To substantially confirm results produced by this thesis, further empirical analysis is needed. First, I 
suggest a time series design of regression analysis for the scores obtained for Central and Eastern 
European EU member states. By conducting a bivariate regression analysis with lagged scores for civil 
society weakness and scores for rule of law performance, the direction of causality indicated by the 
research of my thesis can potentially be confirmed. Furthermore, a large-N study of transitioning 
countries across the globe could also yield interesting insights on the role civil society plays in different 
countries for the consolidation of the rule of law. In addition, by identifying other causal conditions 
(which have not been used in this thesis) that interact with civil society organizations and the rule of 
law, similar fs QCA studies can be conducted and new configurations of sufficient and necessary 
conditions for rule of law breakdown or rule of law strengthening can be found. Moreover, 
determining specifically by what means and channels CSOs influence the rule of law, could provide 
highly valuable and interesting insights for practitioners and scholars alike.   
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